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Capital subsidies and underground production 





In this paper we investigate the effects of different fiscal policies on the 
firm choice to produce underground. We consider a tax evading firm 
operating simultaneously both in the regular and in the underground 
economy. We suggest that such a kind of firm, referred to as moonlighting 
firm, is able to offset the specific costs usually stressed by literature on 
underground production, such as those suggested by Loayza (1994) and 
Anderberg et alii (2003). Investigating the effects of different fiscal policy 
interventions, we find that taxation is a critical parameter to define the size 
of capital allocation in the underground production. In fact, a strong and 
inverse relationship is found, and tax reduction is the best policy to reduce 
the convenience to produce underground. We also confirm the depressing 
effect on investment of taxation (see, for instance, Summers, 1981), so 
that tax reduction has no cost in terms of investment. By contrast, the 
model states that while enforcement is an effective tool to reduce capital 
allocation in the underground production, it also reduce the total capital 
stock. Moreover, we also suggest that the allowance of incentives to 
capital accumulation may generate, in this specific typology of firm, some 
unexpected effects, causing, together with a positive investment process, 
also an increase in the share of irregularity. This finding could explain, in a 
microeconomic framework, the evidence of Italian southern regions, where 
high incentives are combined with high irregularity ratios. 
 
Keywords: tax evasion, moonlighting, capital subsidies, underground 
production. 
JEL classification: E26, E22, H25, H26. 
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Introduction
∗ 
This paper analyzes an apparently conflicting empirical evidence, i.e. the positive correlation 
between incentives to capital accumulation and the size of underground activities.1 We 
investigate whether the allowance of incentives to capital accumulation affects tax evasion, 
from a macroeconomic perspective. 
We study the moonlighting firm, which operates simultaneously in two sectors, the regular 
and the irregular one, using the same stock of capital and evading taxation in the irregular 
sector. Such a kind of firm, besides tax evasion, can exploit a peculiar and additional 
technological benefit compared to a firm operating only in one of the two sectors.
2 The 
analysis is developed in the context of investment theory (partial equilibrium); a 
representative firm maximizes the expected cash flow, choosing simultaneously the optimal 
combination of the stock of capital (dimension) and its allocation between the two possible 
technologies: regular and irregular, conditional on a set of fiscal policy as well as 
technological parameters. 
Here is an overview of our results. Investigating the effects of different fiscal policy 
interventions, we find that taxation is a critical parameter to define the size of capital 
allocation in the underground production. In fact, a strong and inverse relationship is found, 
and tax reduction is the best policy to reduce the convenience to produce underground. We 
also confirm the depressing effect on investment of taxation (see, for instance, Summers, 
1981), so that tax reduction has no cost in terms of investment. By contrast, the model states 
that while enforcement is an effective tool to reduce capital allocation in the underground 
production, it also reduce the total capital stock. When considering the main fiscal policy 
question addressed in the paper, that is whether capital subsidies incentivates tax evasion, 
our results provide strong implications for policy analysis: we suggest that the allowance of 
incentives to capital accumulation may generate, in this specific typology of firm, unexpected 
effects, causing, together with a positive investment process, also an increase in the share of 
irregularity. 
The structure of the paper is as follow. Section 2 provides some stylized facts and defines the 
motivations of the paper. Section 3 explains the firm maximizing problem and characterizes 
the long run equilibrium. In Section 4 the main results of policy analysis are reported and 
commented. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
∗ We thank Maria Rosaria Carillo, Piero Cipollone and Giuseppe Freni for useful comments and discussion. We also 
thank participants to the II Workshop “Le cifre dell’economia sommersa e il loro utilizzo”, and participants to the 
Workshop “Mercato del lavoro e Mezzogiorno: nuove prospettive e vecchi paradigmi”, both held at University of 
Naples “Parthenope”.  
1
There are several interpretation for this form of investment incentive: an investment allowance, an easy credit 
market, a tax credit. 
2In this way moonlighting firm is able to offset the specific costs stressed by standard literature, coming either from 
the high capital cost, as suggested by Loayza (1994), or from the less than perfect information availability, as argued 
by Anderberg et alt. (2003). 
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1. Motivations and Stylized Facts 
1.1 The underground economy  
Underground activities are a fact in many countries, and there are significant indications that 
this phenomenon is large and increasing.
3 The estimated average size of the underground 
sector (as a percentage of total GDP) over 1996-97 in developing countries is 39 percent, in 
transition countries 23 percent, and in OECD countries about 17 percent.
4 
The size of underground economy accounts for approximately 16% of the Italian Value 
Added;
5 the largest amount of irregular Value Added is registered in the services sector, 
followed by industry and finally by agriculture. Regional composition of irregular economy, 
proxied by irregularity in labor utilization, is registered mostly in southern regions. In addition, 
in the services sector there is some homogeneity of irregularity ratios among regions, while 
the industrial sector is the one where territorial differences are the most relevant.
6 
A recent survey (i.e. Di Nicola and Santoro, 2000), based on tax audits on a representative 
sample of 450 Italian companies, points out the main characteristics of Italian firms which 
evade levied taxation. In particular, tax evasion is more widespread among small size firms 
and new firms, especially when located in the south of Italy; moreover, tax audits show that 
evasion is more common in firms with a weak property structure. 
1.2 Capital incentives  
The Institute for the Industrial Promotion (IPI) estimates that during the period 1998-2001 
there are 95 different kind of possible channel to obtain public incentives for firms operating 
in the non agricultural sector; the most of them give a direct or indirect contribution to capital 
accumulation, while only a residual part give a contribution to operating costs (3 of the 
existing 95 incentives laws). Looking at the financial size of these incentives laws, in the 
whole period 1998-2001 the total amount of incentives allowed was 30700 million of euro, 
while in the same period firms applied for a total amount of 66500 million of euro.7 
                                                 
3 There is no universal agreement on what defines the underground economy. Most recent studies use one of more 
of the following definitions: (a) unrecorded economy (failing to fully or properly record economic activity, such as 
hiring workers off-the-book); (b) unreported economy (legal activity meant to evade the tax code); (c) illegal economy 
(trading in illegal goods and services). Obviously, the difficulty in defining the sector extends to the estimation of its 
size. We are concerned with the size of the underground economy as encompassing activities which are otherwise 
legal but go unreported or unrecorded. 
4 Estimates of the underground economy are particularly difficult, as the phenomenon is, by definition, not directly 
measurable. Several methods have been used to the scope, some based on theoretical models, some based 
econometrics and others on micro analysis of agent answers in particular surveys (Schneider and Enste, 2002, for a 
survey). In Italy the National Statistical Office (ISTAT) produces, since 1992, some estimations on the size of the 
underground economy, disaggregated at regional level since 1995. 
5 These estimations are based on a complex procedure, accepted at international level by Eurostat and OECD, and can be 
considered a good approximation, even though not exhaustive, of the real size of the underground economy. For a comment to 
the estimates of the Italian underground economy see also Chiarini and Marzano, 2004. 
6 The ratio between the size of irregular jobs in the South of Italy compared to the North East is 2.0, when considering the 
economy as a whole, and peaks to 6.2 for the industrial sector (see Marzano, 2004). 
7
This amount corresponds to a 2.7% of the yearly average (of the period 1998-2001) GDP. 
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Geographically, applications from southern regions were 68% of total applications, mainly 
among small firms, while in the north of Italy a major role was played by big firms (41% of 
total incentives allowed). Figure 1  reports investment incentives (source Ministero Attività 
Produttive) and irregular workers' sizes (source ISTAT) for each of the 20 Italian regions. A 
casual inspection suggests that there emerges a positive correlation between the two 
measures, particularly relevant when considering irregular workers in the industrial sector 
(the coefficient of correlation is  0.88 ). 
 
Figure 1: Irregular Labour and Average Incentives in Italian Regions. On the left axes it is measured 
the size of the irregularity ratio (irregular workers / total  workers) while in the left axes it is measured 
the amount of the average incentive for each region. 
2. The Model 
This paper suggests a microeconomic explanation of this positive correlation, considering a 
particular model of underground production.
8 The definition of the irregular production needs 
some specifications. Irregular production can be ruled either by a completely irregular firm 
(hereinafter defined as ghost firm), or by a firm which acts only partially in the underground 
sector (hereinafter defined as moonlighting firm). Capital allocating decision would be 
different in the two cases: the share of capital invested in the irregular sectors would be  µ =1 
for a ghost firm, while it belongs in  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ µ  for a moonlighting firm. Literature usually 
assumes that underground firms are less productive than regular firms; some typical 
explanations are: lower entrepreneurial ability; difficulty in getting financial support; high 
                                                 
8
 The origin of the positive correlation between the two index can also be traced back to the common factor 
``underdevelopment''; actually, underground economy and economic underdevelopment are often analyzed together 
(Loayza, 1996; Carillo and Pugno, 2002; Johnson and alt., 1997).   7
transaction costs due to the necessity to locate ``trustworthy'' trading partners.
9 However, we 
are not dealing with a ghost firm, where all the production is hidden. In this paper we consider 
a representative firm which operates ``above'' as well as ``under'' the ground, the so called 
moonlighting firm,  producing an identical homogenous good and using a unique stock of 
capital, but declaring to Internal Revenue Service only a share of its production. We argue 
that the ``moonlighting technology'' may dampen the limits usually assessed for the 
underground firms, generating a specific economy of scale, which cannot be exploited by 
ghost firms. 
Irregular production is a complex task which is addressed to obtaining one of the following 
alternatives, aiming at: 
•  ``extra-profit '': this is the situation of medium size productive units, largely regular, 
with their own brand, which exploit the underground production to gain extra profits 
(but also the partial decentralization by a regular firm toward smaller and irregular 
productive units referred to as faç onismo or ``local underground district'' by Censis, 
2003); 
•  ``surviving '': this situation applies for small firms producing largely underground, 
which use the regular production as a convenient screen to avoid fiscal controls. 
The technology of the moonlighting firm is able to cope with these motivations. 
2.1 The Technology 
Suppose there exists an homogenous good which can be produced using two different 
technologies, the regular technology and the underground one; regular production is taxed 
while underground production is not declared to Internal Revenue Service. 
Each firm can decide to specialize into regular production, underground production or both. 
Denote with K the capital stock, and with  µ  or (1-µ) the share of capital allocated to the 







R K B Y K A Y ) ) 1 (   ; ) ( µ µ − = =  
where α  represents the elasticity of capital stocks in the two sectors.
11 The two sectors use 
identical technologies with the exception of the two scaling factors  A  and  B . Similarly to 
what occurs in a two sector model with sector specific externalities, we assume that from the 
prospective of a firm operating in a single sector the two parameters are taken as positive 
constants, while for a firm operating simultaneously in the two sectors (moonlighting) B is a 
function of the total use of capital: 
σ a K B =  
 
and it represents the moonlighting effect. 
The parameter σ  measures the entity of the scale economies generated by the simultaneous 
implementation of the regular and underground technology. In the sequel of the paper we 
refer to this as to the moonlighting effect. Condition 1 below suggests that the size of scale 
                                                 
9
See Anderberg and alt. (2003); Loayza (1994). 
10
To simplify the analysis we are considering a single factor technology which employs only capital; this is 
tantamount to a constant returns of scale technology, with capital and labor inputs: in this case, output as well as 
capital would be measured per unit of employee. 
11
Since both sector produces the same commodity, the capital elasticities are assumed to be identical.   8
economies should be sufficiently low to ensures that returns to scale are not increasing at the 
firm level: 
 Condition 1   a
a − < <
1 0 σ  
The restriction on the size of the moonlighting effect σ , and, consequently, the exclusion of 
any sort of increasing returns of scale, is a necessary assumption to allow the moonlighting 
firm choosing an optimal size of capital dimension, capturing the positive interaction between 
regular and irregular production.
12 
Given these assumptions, total production value is computed by linearly aggregating regular 
and underground produced outputs. Incorporating the scale effect B , total production reads: 
 
. ) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( σ µ µ
+ − + = + =
a a a
U R K K A Y Y Y  (1) 
 
The firm behaves as a partial tax-evader, because it complies with fiscal law only for the 
regular production. 
The institutional side of the model is defined by the triplet { } s , ,τ ρ , where τ  defines a 
proportional tax rate levied on output, s  represents a surcharge factor (s>1) levied on the tax 
rate if a firm is detected evading; finally, ρ is the probability that a firm is detected and 
convicted of tax evasion.
13 
Firm's revenues equal: 
  Detected  REVD= ( ) U R Y s Y τ τ − + − 1 ) 1 (  
  (ρ)   
REV:     
  Not Detected  REVND= U R Y Y + − ) 1 ( τ  
  (1- ρ)   
 
 and the ex-ante expected revenues are: 
 
( )
. ) 1 ( ) 1 (




REV E REV E R E
ρτ τ
ρ ρ
− + − =
= − + =
 (2) 
                                                 
12
 In the appendix it is shown that a sufficient condition to allow saddle path stability 
is: () () a a a a / 1 / 1
2 − < − < σ  . 
13
Literature, either empirical and theoretical, usually considers taxation and regulations as the main causes of the 
existence of the underground sector (see Thomas,1992; Tanzi, 1980; Schneider and Enste,2002; Dallago,1990) 
devoting much attention to analysis of the entrepreneurial choice between regular and irregular production and 
concentrating attention either on the tax evasion decision or on the labor market. The analysis of tax evasion, 
starting from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki, (1974) focuses on the structure of marginal taxation, 
and/or on the consequences for private/social welfare, without investigating the link between tax evasion and 
technology (see Cowell, 1990; Trandel and Snow, 1999, for  surveys on tax evasion, and Alm, (1985), for the welfare 
effects of evasion). On the other side, when focusing on the technology of underground activities, literature very 
often concentrate the analysis on the labor input, neglecting capital utilization (see Portes, Castells and Benton, 
1989; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001; Busato and Chiarini, 2004; Busato, Chiarini and Rey, 2005). 
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It can be shown that the following condition ensures the existence of both productions: 
 Condition 2    1 ≥ s   and   () . 1 ρ ρ − ≤ s   
Condition 2 states that the surcharge must be higher than unity, and that the expected 
surcharge must be lower than the threshold  (1-ρ) , otherwise the expected return to a unit of 
evaded production, (1-ρ)τ-ρτs, would be negative, so that the firm would have no 
convenience to operate in the underground sector. 
Given all parametric condition, Lemma 1 below shows that there exists a well behaved 
Production Possibility Frontier. 
 Lemma 1 (Production Possibility Frontier) There exists a negatively sloped and concave 











Re  . 
 Proof APPENDIX. 
2.2 Value of the Firm 
At time zero the firm is endowed with a given positive amount of capital  ( ) 0 K  , and with an 
intertemporally fixed flow of a non-capital resource (labor, land, 0 NK  ), which are normalized 
to unity ( 1 0 = NK ). 
Each instant a firm maximizes the intertemporal cash-flow function, choosing how many 
resources to allocate to the regular production, µ, and how much revenue to invest, I. 
Investing is a costly process for firms; the assumption here adopted is that the adjustment 
costs are a convex function of the rate of change of the capital stock (no learning by doing): 
. 1 ; ) ( > = b I I C
b  
In addition, we assume that investments are encouraged by the government, which provides 
a capital contribution proportional to total investment, α, to firms which are willing to increase 
their capital stock. We assume that government neither is able to know whether new capital 
will be employed in regular or in the irregular production, nor dispose of accountability tools 
enforcing the firm to declare only the capital regularly employed.
14 
The value of the firm is the expected present value of its revenues net of expenditures on 
capital input. The representative firm maximizes expected cash flow V  subject to a 
constraint set: 
 
                                                 
14
This assumption, merged with Condition 2 in the main text, is a strong incentive toward underground production. A 
different situation would occur whether fiscal authorities would be more effective in allowing incentives to capital than 
in detecting tax evasion. In this case the rational agent would choose to produce irregularly, YU >0, but asking for 
incentives only on the regular share of its investment, αµI. This hypothesis complicates considerably the analysis, 
generating unstable and oscillating equilibria. 
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The quantity  
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
σ µ ρτ µ τ
+ − − + −
a a a K s K A   represents firm's revenues, net of 
taxation, I is the amount of gross investment, and δ  is the physical depreciation rate of 
capital. The amount αI  denotes an investment allowance, where α belongs to the (0,1) 
interval; it could account for several different typologies of financial support to investment, 
such as equipment grants to firms investing in less developed areas, financial facilities to 
small and medium sized enterprisers, financial facilities for specific investment programs 
eligible by the ``Local Business Development'' National Operational Program (NOP). 
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where r is the exogenous discount rate. 
The first order conditions obtain:
15 
                                                 
15
The optimization problem is well defined,e.g. the objective function is concave. Actually: 
  0 / , / , /
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  (7-12) 
 
Proposition 1 below proves that the model has a an interior solution. 
 Proposition1  A firm opting for moonlighting   ) 1 0 ( < < µ   has no convenience neither to 
become completely regular   ) 1 ( = µ   nor to turn into a ghost firm   ) 0 ( = µ  . 
 Proof APPENDIX. 
 
Manipulation of the first order conditions leads to the following conditions characterizing 
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The investment function (Equation 13) has standard characteristics: for a given level of fiscal 
allowances, investment is increasing in   0 φ  , and gross investment is zero when the marginal 
value of capital is just equal to the market price of capital, normalized to 1, net of fiscal 
allowance  α. The allowance of fiscal incentives to capital accumulation clearly increases 
investment. 
Equation 14 ensures the optimal allocation of capital between the regular and underground 
production: the marginal effect of a capital reallocation on its net-of-tax productivity in the two 
sectors must be equal. It implicitly defines the equilibrium level of regularity as a negative 
function of the total capital:
16  
                                                 
16
This result is a consequence of the endogenous TFP in the underground technology. 
 


















































µ µ  (14’) 
 
Combining the first two equations of the system (13)-(16),   ( ) 0 φ I   and   ) (K µ  , in the last 
ones, we obtain a dynamical system such that: 
 
() () [ ]
() . '
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( '
0
1 ) 1 ( 1
0 0
K I K
K a s K aA r
a a a a
δ φ
σ µ ρτ µ τ φ δ φ
σ
− =
+ − − − − − + =
− + ∗ − ∗
 (17-18) 
 
The first condition states that the marginal revenue of capital equals its user cost, 
() ' 0 0 φ φ δ − + r  ; the second condition implies that K is increasing when   0 φ   is so higher 
than the marginal cost of capital, 1-α, to achieve a level of net investment larger than physical 
depreciation of capital, δK. 
2.3 The Steady State 
2.3.1 Qualitative Analysis 
The Steady state (  0 ' ' 0 = = K φ  ) is characterized by the two equations:  






+ − − + − =
− + ∗ − ∗
+
K I
K a s K aA
a a a a
r
δ φ




1 ) 1 ( 1 1
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (  (19) 
 
The first equation tell us that in equilibrium (long run) the shadow price of capital is the 
discounted value of the net-of-tax marginal productivity of capital; the second condition states 
that the stock of capital is stable when investment is just equal to physical depreciation of 
capital. 
The two steady state relations can be geometrically represented in the space  ) , ( 0 φ K . For 
our parametrization (see next section) the first one describes a negatively shaped and 
convex curve: larger amount of capital reduce its marginal productivity, so that in equilibrium 
a lower value for the shadow price for capital is commanded (see the  0 ' 0 = φ  locus in the left 
panel of Figure 2). The locus  0 '= K  (see the left panel of Figure 2) is displayed as an 
increasing relationship in the space  ) , ( 0 φ K , consistently with standard literature on 
investment function; as investment must be equal to the depreciation in the capital stock, 
then, in order to maintain an higher stock of capital an higher shadow price is commanded. 
In the right panel of Figure 2 it is represented, in the space  ) , ( K µ , the relationship   () K
∗ µ   
defined by Equation 14': for each level of  K  identified by the solution of the system 19, a 
unique cash-flow maximizing value of µ  is identified. The locus  ( ) K
∗ µ  is monotone and 
decreasing; in fact, given the nature of the moonlighting effect, the larger is the amount of   13
total capital, the more convenient is to shift it in the underground production (e.g. to decrease  
µ). 
 Proposition 2 In the long run, the dynamical system  of Eqs. 17-18 admits a unique steady 
state. 
 Proof APPENDIX 
 Proposition 3 The steady state of the dynamical system  of Eqs. 17-18 is always a saddle 
path. 
 Proof APPENDIX 
 
Figure 2: Points upper the locus  0 ' 0 = φ are characterized, for each level of K, by a  0 φ  higher than 
the equilibrium level; given the dynamic expressed in eq. 17 it implies a growth of the shadow price of 
capital (arrows point up). Similarly, when considering points upper to the  0 '= K  we register for each K 
a  0 φ  higher than the equilibrium level; given the investment function, Eq. 13, and the dynamic 
expressed in Eq. 18, it implies a growth of the capital stock (arrows point right). 
 
2.3.2 Parametrization 
The model depends on five parameters: the capital elasticity, a, which, coherently with 
standard literature, is set at the value 0.3; the exogenous discount rate, r, set to the value 
0.025; the rate of physical depreciation of capital, δ, calibrated to 0.125. The technological 
parameters  A  and  σ, are set, respectively to the value 10 and 0.5. 
Next, the taxation rate, τ , is set to 0.4 to match the average high level of direct taxation in 
Italy in recent years; the surcharge applied to tax evaders, s , following the Italian civil law, is 
set to 1.3; the probability to be catched when cheating the government,  ρ, is set to a very low 
value, 0.05, to give an idea of low enforcement, which can be assimilated to the Italian actual 




125 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 1 05 . 0 025 . 0 5 . 0 40 . 0 10 14 . 0
δ ρ σ τ α a s r A
 
 
Given this set of parameters, the solution of the dynamical system identifies a single long run 
equilibrium, given by the triplet: 
( ). 8818 . 0 ; 0354 . 2 ; 5242 . 15 0 = = =
∗ ∗ ∗ µ φ K  
The graphic analysis of the long run equilibrium is shown in Figure 2. The left panel displays, 
in the space  ) , ( 0 φ K , the two steady state relationships (system 19) and the local dynamics: 
the stability arrows show that there is a single stable arm which brings the firm toward the 
long run equilibrium. 
Looking at the local dynamics (left panel), the upper left side of the stable arm is 
characterized by a stock of capital lower than the equilibrium and a shadow price of the 
capital higher than the equilibrium level, so that the rational firm increases the stock of capital 
(net investment are larger than capital depreciation) until the shadow price reach its 
equilibrium level, at the steady state. When the capital stock dimension is lower than optimal, 
given equation 14, the regularity share is higher than optimal (see also the right panel of 
Figure 2); during the process of capital accumulation, the firm also shifts capital into the 
underground technology, until marginal productivities are leveled across sectors (see. eq. 
14). A symmetric process applies when capital dimension is higher than optimal and the firm 
operates on the lower and right side of the stable arm.
18 
2.4 The scale of the regular technology (A) 
The parameter  A  can be considered the scale of production in the regular technology, and it 




REG R K A K A Y ) (µ ≡ =    (20) 
Changes in this technological parameter generates notably differences with the baseline 
calibration, both in terms of optimal capital dimension and in terms of share of regularity. In 
fact, using a unitary productive scale,  and leaving all the other parameters unchanged, we 
get a new long run equilibrium for the optimal capital dimension and its allocation between 
the two sectors:   ) 28 . 0 ; 92 . 2 ( = =
∗ ∗ µ K  . 
By contrast, a larger productive scale, say A=20, generates the equilibrium   
                                                 
17
The calibration of the fiscal parameters  τ  and α  has been chosen starting from the recent analysis of the Italian 
firm fiscal regimes addressed in Bontempi and alt. (2001). In particular, incentives to investment identified as Credito 
di Imposta ranges from an average level of 0.14 for the Center-North regions, to a 0.65 for the less developed region 
(Calabria). As to corporate taxation, the figure reported in KPMG (2004) for Italy is 37.25%. See also Busato and 
Chiarini (2004) for calibration of a macroeconomic model with tax evasion. 
18 Every other path different from the saddle path brings the firm far from the long run equilibrium in areas in which 
transversality condition (Eq. 6) no longer applies. 
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) 94 . 0 ; 94 . 34 ( = =
∗ ∗ µ K  . 
These experiments leave to foresight a strong and direct relationship between the scale of 
regular production, which can be considered a proxy for the dimension of the firm, and the 
choice to operate regularly. Literature usually agree on the importance of firm dimension in 
affecting the propensity to operate in the underground economy, as already pointed out in 
Section 1 and 2. 
This result is essentially derived by equation 14, which guarantees the optimal allocation of 
capital between the two productions. 
3. Policy Experiments 
This section presents selected fiscal policy experiments, to evaluate their impact on the long 
run equilibrium as well as on the investment policy of the moonlighting firm. 
3.1 Case # 1: low taxation. 
The first exercise is about the effects of changes in the taxation rate, τ: 
 
() 40 . 0
125 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 1 05 . 0 025 . 0 5 . 0 20 . 0 10 14 . 0
* δ ρ σ τ α a s r A
 
 
Lowering taxation by 50% causes an increase in the long run level of the capital stock as well 
as the share of regularity: the new steady state equilibrium is given by the triplet   
( ) 9114 . 0 ; 0749 . 2 ; 6026 . 21 0 = = =
∗ ∗ ∗ µ φ K  , causing a 40% increase of the capital stock, 
and a 3.4% increase in the size of regular use of capital. In fact, tax reduction increases the 
net-of-tax marginal revenue of capital, and it occurs in a relatively stronger way in the regular 
technology (due to Condition 2). 
Figure 3 presents the graphical analysis of this shock; the change in the taxation rate 
identifies a new steady state at an higher level of both capital and its shadow price. There is 
an initial overshooting of the shadow price of capital, generating an investment process, 
which lasts until the new long run equilibrium is reached.
19 
 
                                                 
19
This analysis is coherent with standard literature on investment (see Summers, 1981; Abel, 1982).   16
 F    
Figure 3: The new tax rate causes an upward shift, due to the increase in the marginal revenue of 
capital, in the curve  0 ' 0 = φ , while the  0 '= K  is unchanged. In the right panel there is an upward 
translation of the curve µ (K) due to the fall in the taxation ratio. Given the initial stock of total capital, 
the share of its regular use, µ, jumps on the new µ(K) curve (the cross one), so that an initial 
overshooting occurs (see the dashed arrows). 
 
 
It is, then, interesting investigating the dynamics of the capital allocation, µ. The fall in the 
taxation ratio,  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( τ ρτ − − s , consequent the fall in the tax rate, alters the equilibrium 
relationship between  K  and  µ  which level marginal productivity of capital in the two 
productions (Eq. 14), changing their relative convenience.
20 Actually, for each level of the 
total capital stock, and all the other relevant parameters being equal, a tax cut induces the 
moonlighting firm to be more regular, experiencing an initial overshooting in its regular size. 
As long as the capital stock increases toward its steady state level, the firm will also reduce 
the share of regularity adjusting toward its coherent equilibrium level of µ . 
3.2 Case # 2: high enforcement. 
The second policy experiment carried out considers the effects of the enforcement policy, 
doubling up, alternatively, either the detection probability, ρ, or the penalty s : 
                                                 
20
Given Condition 2 in the main text, a fall in the tax rate necessarily causes a fall in the taxation ratio   
). 1 /( ) 1 ( τ ρτ − − s   
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Improving the level of enforcement causes an increase in the equilibrium level of the share of 
regularity, but also a reduction of the capital stock, in fact the new steady state equilibrium is 
given by the triplet: 
( ). 8859 . 0 ; 0346 . 2 ; 4179 . 15 0 = = =
∗ ∗ ∗ µ φ K  
This produces an 0.7% reduction of the capital stock, and a 0.5% increase in the size of 
regular use of capital.  
The dynamical analysis of this shock can be seen in Figure 4; starting from the baseline 
equilibrium, the shadow price of capital shows a downward jump on the new saddle path, 
lowering the capital stock until the new steady state is reached. As concern the share of 
regularity, the qualitative effect are similar to those achieved for the tax cut: for each level of 
the total capital stock, a rise in enforcement is equivalent to a fall in the taxation ratio, 
inducing the moonlighting firm to be more regular. 
3.3 Case # 3: high incentives. 
The third policy experiment is the change (a doubling up) in the size of fiscal allowances to 
capital accumulation:  
() 14 . 0
125 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 1 05 . 0 025 . 0 5 . 0 40 . 0 10 28 . 0
* δ ρ σ τ α a s r A
 
 
Increasing the size of fiscal incentives to capital accumulation pushes the equilibrium level of 
the capital stock up, as we would intuitively expect, but also generates a marginal reduction 
of the share of regularity. The new equilibrium is given by the triplet:  
( ) 8796 . 0 ; 9069 . 1 ; 1079 . 17 0 = = =
∗ ∗ ∗ µ φ K  
 
these figures represent a 10% increase of the capital stock, and a 0.2% reduction in the 
regular use of capital.
21 The negative impact of incentives to capital accumulation on 
regularity introduces a micro-founded explanation of the observed positive correlation 
between capital accumulation incentives and the size of the underground economy observed 
in Italy. 
The increase in fiscal incentive to capital accumulation reduces the cost of capital, so that 
                                                 
21
The first order conditions suggest that the critical parameters for capital allocation in the underground production 
are the size of the moonlighting effect,  σ; the scale of regular production, A; and the taxation ratio   
) 1 /( ) 1 ( τ ρτ − − s  . In particular, if we calibrate the TFP in the regular technology, A, to a value lower than the 
baseline, the marginal effect of a rise in incentives on the irregular share of capital is more sharp. For instance, 
setting A=5, the fall in the regular use of capital is about 0.5%; for A=2 the fall is about 1%. A similar effect occurs 
when calibrating higher values for the moonlighting effect σ.  
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there is an immediate effect on investment. In the left panel of Figure 5 the locus   0 '= K   
moves downward, and the shadow price of capital jumps on the new saddle path at a level 
higher than the new equilibrium, inducing a flow of new investment. The rise of capital stock 
alters the equilibrium marginal productivity (Eq. 14), so that as long as net investment are 
positive, the firm also reallocates capital between sectors. Since the moonlighting effect 
implies that the capital increase affects the TFP in the irregular technology (σ>0), it is optimal 




Figure 4: the change in enforcement causes an downward shift in the curve  0 ' 0 = φ , due to the fall in 
the after-tax marginal revenue of capital in the underground technology. The right panel shows the 
immediate increase in the allocation of capital into the regular sector, e.g. a jump on the new (cross) 
curve µ (K), followed by a gradual increase as long as capital adjusts toward its long run level. 
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Figure 5:  rising subsidies to investment generates capital accumulation, but it also spoors the 
allocation of capital into the underground production. 
3.4 Case # 4: Moonlighting effect 
Finally, we consider a different value for the technological parameter σ, which can be 
considered only indirectly a policy instrument, in the sense that the possibility for the 
moonlighting firm to exploit the external effect of the aggregate capital is supposed to be a 
function of the institutional and social framework in which firms operate. A larger value for  σ  
implies that the moonlighting firm strongly benefits from the simultaneity of its two 
productions. 
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Doubling the size of the moonlighting effect causes a noticeable increase in the equilibrium 
level of the capital stock as well as a strong reduction in the share of regularity; the new 
equilibrium triplet is: 
 ( ) 7857 . 0 ; 0696 . 2 ; 6855 . 20 0 = = =
∗ ∗ ∗ µ φ K  , 
these figures account for a 33% increase in the size of the capital stock, and quite large 
increase in its irregular use, as µ is downsized by a 10%. To better appreciate the intuition, 
here it is useful to reconsider Condition 1 (the restriction   a
a − < 1 σ   aims at avoiding the 
occurrence of increasing returns of scale). Without this assumption, there would be no   20
equilibrium, and the concavity of the objective function would be no longer ensured. Even 
more interestingly, under increasing returns of scale due to the moonlighting effect, there is 
no convenience to keep moonlighting, and the solution converges toward a ghost firm, e.g. 




Figure 6: the rise in σ  immediately rises the marginal productivity of capital in the irregular technology,  
so that the shadow price of capital rises, and the curve  0 ' 0 = φ  moves upward; simultaneously, the 
firm reallocates capital into the irregular production, and the curve µ (K), in the right panel, also moves 
downward. 
4. Policy Implications 
To discuss the implications of policy incentives under underground economy, it is useful to 
give a qualitative synthesis of the experiments reported in the previous sections. Table 1 
shows that both enforcement and tax reduction are effective in contrasting underground 
production, while their consequences on capital accumulation are contrasting: whilst tax 
reduction is also an incentive to capital accumulation, enforcement has a depressing effect 
on the stock of capital. Therefore, a trade-off arises when strengthening enforcement 
between regularity and investment. A similar but opposite trade-off arises when using 
                                                 
22
Graphically, the locus   0 '= K   would have the usual increasing shape, but we would observe also an increasing 
locus   0 ' 0 = φ  , situated above the   0 '= K   so that no equilibrium could be found. 
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subsidies to raise investment, because this policy also incentives firms to engage in 
underground production. 
  
Table 1: Qualitative effects of different fiscal policies on the long run equilibrium. 
Fiscal Policy   
∗ K     
∗ µ     
∗
0 φ   
Tax  Reduction  + + + 
Incentives Rise  +  -  - 
Enforcement Rise  -  +  - 
   
Welfare effects are more clearly shown in Table 2, considering the total production as an 
indicator of total welfare. 
  
Table 2: Quantitative effects of different fiscal policies on the long run equilibrium. Baseline long 
run equilibrium is set to 100. 
Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy   
TOT Y   
Baseline 100 
Tax Reduction  110,7 
Incentives Rise  103 
Enforcement Rise  99,8 
   
Two interesting issues arise when looking at the welfare effects. First, tax reduction generate 
a considerable positive effect on total production; by contrast, strengthening enforcement is 
welfare-depressing. Second, incentives are positive for total welfare, but not as much as tax 
reduction. 
Further useful insights may be drawn from the analysis of the reaction function, which 
expresses the long run values of total capital and its regular share as function of the different 
size of each single fiscal policy parameter. In the right panel of Figure 7 are shown the 
effects of the variation of a single parameter (taxation rate, enforcement, incentives and 
moonlighting effect) on the size of regular capital, µ, while in the left panel the reaction 
functions for the total capital stock are displayed. 
The Figure 7 shows that reaction functions are always monotone, but they are also non 
linear. The figure highlights the deep impact of taxation both on the capital stock and on the 
size of its irregular use; no one of the other parameters have a quantitatively similar impact. 
Tax policies are the only ones causing a co-movement in the two objective variables total 
capital and regular share: starting from the baseline value of taxation, 0,4, a fall in tax rate 
generates a capital as well as a regular share increase, and a welfare gain.   22
 
Figure 7: reaction to taxation (cross); incentives (dotted); enforcement (dash-dot); and moonlighting 
effect (dash). The range of variation of each parameter is (0.1-0.9). The horizontal line represents the 
equilibrium level of total capital (left panel) and its regular use (right panel) in the baseline calibration. 
Each reaction function crosses the horizontal line when the relevant fiscal policy parameter reach its 
baseline value. 
 
As to enforcement, its impact on underground production is relatively stronger than its 
depressing effect on capital accumulation. This evidence, associated to the strong and 
positive effects of a tax cut, and to the welfare effect stressed in Table 2, seriously 
depreciates the role of enforcement in fighting underground economy. Looking at Figure 7, 
we should also conclude that fiscal authorities should be very careful when planning policies 
directed to support investment, especially in areas where underground economy is sizeable. 
The Figure 7 shows that incentives impact deeply on capital accumulation, but they also 
produce an increase of the irregular use of capital. In designing policy incentives to the stock 
of capital, it should be taken into account the ``nature'' of the firm, and, in particular, whether 
in the sector, and also in the area where the firm operates there exists a large part of output 
that is unreported. 
As incentives to investment always produce incentives to go underground, it is possible to 
argue there exist the risk that they tend, via underground activities, to be an inconsistent 
policy. If government policies support moonlighting firms, firms will have a lower incentive to 
increase their reported capital, because doing so could imply a reduction in the level of 
incentives they enjoy. Therefore, the government would face the spur to provide incentives to 
capital accumulation for a longer time than expected.   23
5. Conclusions 
Tax evasion, far from being an academic hypothesis, is a widespread reality in the Italian 
economy. In this paper we have investigated the effects of several different fiscal policies on 
tax-evading firms. The innovation of the paper lies in the representation of a technological 
advantage (scale economies) specific of moonlighting firms compared to ghost firms. 
The model is able to catch some quite standard results in the literature about the 
underground economy, such as the relationship between the scale of production and the size 
of the underground economy: the larger is the scale of regular production the lower is the 
share of capital allocated in the underground economy. 
Moreover, there are several striking policy implications that we can draw from our analysis. 
First of all the troubling aspects of the fiscal allowances. In the context depicted by our 
moonlighting firm, government's incentives to the capital stock accumulation turn to be an 
incentive not only to capital accumulation but also to its underground use. 
A second issue is the effectiveness of the different policies aiming at reducing underground 
production. Even though tax reduction and enforcement both cause a lower convenience to 
operate irregularly, their effects on total welfare are basically different. In fact, while a tax 
reduction is also welfare improving, a trade-off arises between regularity and capital 
accumulation if the contrast to irregular production is pursued through enforcement.   24
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 Lemma 1 There exists a negatively sloped and concave production PPF such that:  
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 Proof We consider the identity:   ( ) 1 1 = − + µ µ   
Using the production functions, we get: 
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and, after some algebra: 
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The Marginal Rate of Transformation is: 
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The first derivative of the MRT is: 
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 Proposition 1 A firm opting for moonlighting has no convenience neither to 
become completely regular   ) 1 ( = µ   nor to turn into a ghost firm   ) 0 ( = µ  . 
 Proof  µ   as well as  () µ − 1   are the basis of a negative power in Eq. 8, so that to 
have a finite solution they necessarily must lie in the open interval  ( ). 1 , 0   
 Proposition 2 In the long run, the dynamical system  of Eqs. 17-18 admits a 
unique stady state. 
 Proof System 19 can be written as follows: 
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First Step: 
To show that the first equation expresses   0 φ   as a monotone and decreasing function 
of the stock of capital  K   . 
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is a strictly decreasing and monotone function of K: 
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It implies that the first term of  
( )
dK
K d 0 φ   is always negative, so that we need to 
demonstrate that the second one is negative too: 
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Using again the definition of   ) (K
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As  µ   is a majorant of this last expression, we consider the case   1 = µ   to get: 
  () ( ) a a a a / 1 / 1
2 − < − < σ   
This condition can be considered a sufficient condition to get the requested monotony 
of the relation   . 0 ' 0 = φ   
Second Step 
The second equation expresses   0 φ   a monotone and increasing function of the stock 
of capital  K  , in fact   () ( ) 0 1
2 0 > − =
− b
dK
d K b b δ
φ   for each   1 > b  . 
Given that the codomain of the first equation is  ( ) +∞ ; 0   while the second equation 
has codomain  () +∞ − ; 1 α  , it follows that there exists a single value of K such that 
the two equations simultaneously applies. 
 
 Proposition 3 The steady state of the dynamical system  of Eqs. 17-18 is always a 
saddle path. 
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and it has a trace and a determinant given by: 
  () ( ); / / ;
2 2
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where 
  () [ ] dK K a s K aA d K
a a a a
/ ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( /
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σ σ µ ρτ µ τ   
Local stability, and in particular saddle path stability, requires that the the trace 
should be positive, while the determinant should be negative, when evaluated at the 
steady state. Under our parametrization it implies that the condition   0 /
2 2 < ∂ Π ∂ K  , 
which is the necessary condition to get a concave objective function, is also a 
sufficient condition to get saddle path stability. Given the demonstration of the first 
step of proposition 2, it follows that 
  0 /
2 2 < ∂ Π ∂ K  . 
This result implies that the Determinant of Jacobian matrix of linearized system of 
Equations 17 and 18 is negative, and it underlies that the equilibrium is a saddle path. 
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